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This paper contributes to the analysis of where and how both exploitation and exploration 
may take place inside and between communities and organizations. It connects with the 
discussion of differences between communities of practice and epistemic communities. 
The analysis allows for differences in cognition within communities of practice 
(‘cognitive distance’). Such distance yields potential novelty but creates problems in 
utilizing that potential. In communities of practice and epistemic communities different 
trade-offs are made between the advantages and disadvantages of cognitive distance. 
Communities of practice are more oriented at exploitation, at relatively small cognitive 
distance. Exploration may take place in epistemic communities, with larger internal 
cognitive distance, but may also arise from interaction between different communities of 
practice, utilizing the distance between them. Organizations serve to provide the basis for 
the governance of such interaction. This, however, does limit the cognitive distance, and 
hence exploration potential, within an organization. For more radical exploration, 
interaction is needed between organizations, at the price of greater efforts to set up and 
govern collaboration. Next to communities of practice, epistemic communities and 
organizations, the analysis also includes communities of professionals across different 
organizations. They also have a role to play in a wider system of organizational forms for 
exploitation and exploration. 




A central issue in theories of organizational learning concerns the relation between 
knowledge of individuals and knowledge on the level of an organization (Cohen 1991, 
Cook & Yanow 1993, Weick & Westley 1996). According to Weick (1991), 
organisational learning entails a process of acquiring common knowledge, or beliefs, or 
norms, which includes the process of accepting and validating individually acquired 
knowledge as useful (Duncan and Weiss, 1979). In this process there is an important 
intermediate level of ‘communities’, between an organization as a whole and individual 
people. There, knowledge links between individuals are achieved and common 
knowledge is acquired. The notion of Communities Of Practice (COP’s), initiated by 
Lave & Wenger (1991) and Brown & Duguid (1991), and identified as a mechanism 
through which knowledge is held, transferred and created, has attracted much attention as 
well as considerable criticism and confusion (e.g. see Cohendet et al. 2001, Contu & 
Wilmott 2003, Bogenrieder & Nooteboom 2004a, Roberts 2006, Handley et al. 2006). 
Here, I consider three issues. The first concerns the diversity of knowledge and 
interests, and hence possible tensions and conflicts of interest, and differences of power, 
within a COP, which are in danger of being neglected due to the connotation, intended or 
not, of a ‘community’ as being ‘warm’, consensual and without conflict. A second issue, 
which forms the central subject of the present paper, is whether, or to what extent, COP’s 
are fit not only for holding, sharing and improving knowledge and competence, in 
exploitation, but also for creating new knowledge and competence, in exploration (March 
1991). In exploitation there is plasticity of routines, but not the replacement of routines 
by new ones. The distinction between exploitation and exploration is comparable to ‘first 
order’ in contrast with ‘second order’ learning (Bateson 1973), and to ‘single loop’, in 
contrast with ‘double loop’ learning (Argyris & Schön 1978), and perhaps also to 
‘incremental’ in contrast with ‘radical’ innovation. In the first, there is variation within a 
basic framework or set of principles, and in the latter there is a break of the framework. 
Or in yet other words, in the first there is improvisation and variation, while in the latter 
there is invention. The two issues of diversity and exploration are related. Exploratory 
learning requires diversity of knowledge, which may be combined into something new, in 
Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’.  A third issue is that COP’s are defined in such 
wide and general terms that they could encompass a wide variety of groups of people 
working together. 
According to Wenger (1998), members of COP’s establish relationships and norms of 
behaviour through mutual engagement, are bound together by an understanding and sense 
of joint enterprise, and produce a shared repertoire of language, routines, artifacts and 
stories. Wenger and Snyder (2000:139, 140) characterize a community of practice as 
follows: 
 
a ‘group of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise’, which 
can ‘drive strategy, generate new lines of business, solve problems, promote the spread of best practices, 
develop professional skills, and help companies to recruit and retain talent’. 
 
This can be interpreted so widely as to allow for both exploitation and exploration. 
However, the ‘shared expertise and repertoire’ raise doubt concerning cognitive variety   3
within a COP, needed for innovation. The ‘joint enterprise and binding together’ suggest 
dense, strong, durable ties, while the social network literature suggests that for novelty 
ties should be sparse (non-redundant) and weak (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992, 2000). 
With a set of criteria concerning the structure, content and strength of ties, and type and 
variety of knowledge or competence involved, Bogenrieder and Nooteboom (2004a) 
provided a basis for a more precise classification of a wide variety of learning groups 
according to how they score on those criteria. Interpreting COP’s in terms of that 
classification, in an empirical study of five learning groups they found none that closely 
fitted that interpretation of COP’s. 
In view of doubts concerning the innovative potential of COP’s, several authors 
(Haas 1992, Steinmüller 2000, Cowan, David & Foray 2000, Cohendet et al. 2001, 
Cohendet 2005) have proposed and discussed the contrasting notion of ‘epistemic 
communities’ (EC). EC are commonly defined as groups or networks of people who 
perform exploratory learning. They engage in transdisciplinary and/or transfunctional 
activities, at the interstices between the various disciplines. In contrast with communities 
of practice, they are not organized around a common discipline or practice but around a 
common topic or problem.  
In a later paper, Wenger et al. (2002: 141, quoted in Roberts 2006: 626) 
acknowledged the ‘downside’ of COP’s, where ‘the very qualities that make a 
community an ideal structure for learning – a shared perspective on a domain, trust, a 
communal identity, longstanding relationships an established practice – are the same 
qualities that can hold it hostage to its history and its achievements’.  Here, it is important 
to distinguish between learning in the sense of absorbing existing knowledge from others 
and learning in the sense of discovery or invention. For the first, a COP provides an ideal 
environment, for an entrant in a COP to learn its practices. For the second, there is great 
doubt.  
The purpose of the present paper is to further analyse the differences and connections 
between communities for exploitation and exploration. First, the paper discusses the 
notions of exploitation and exploration, and an underlying ‘activity theory’ of cognition. 
Here, cognition is a wide notion, which includes both competence (knowledge, learning) 
and governance (moral norms, values and feelings). Second, it picks up the issue of 
variety within and between communities. It discusses and employs the notion of 
‘cognitive distance’, as a construct for cognitive and moral variety, and its effect on 
collaboration and learning. Third, the paper considers the cognitive and cultural identity 
of communities, as a basis for limiting (intellectual and moral) cognitive distance. Fourth, 
it analyzes cognitive distance within COP’s, between COP’s within firms, and between 
firms, and the implications for the locus of exploitation and exploration. It ends with the 
proposition that COP’s serve primarily as units of exploitation, with limited cognitive 
distance and a certain focus on substantive issues and personalized governance, while 
between COP’s, within a firm, cognitive distance is greater, with a wider focus of 
substantive issues, yielding more exploration, but with still some limitation of cognitive 
distance, especially on moral issues, while between firms cognitive distance opens up 
further, also on moral issues, which further widens the potential for exploration.         4
 
 
Activity theory of cognition and meaning 
 
In their account of communities of practice, Brown & Duguid (1991) and Lave & 
Wenger (1991) employed an ‘activity-theory’ or ‘situated action theory’ of knowledge 
(see e.g. Blackler 1995), inspired also by the work of Kolb (1984), in which action and 
learning feed each other, and where ‘learning is a bridge between working and 
innovation’. Brown and Duguid employed the notion of ‘canonical’ and ‘non-canonical’ 
or ‘procedural’ (Cohen & Bacdayan 1996) knowledge. Canonical knowledge entails 
decontextualized, codified and formalized rules for operation. Inevitably, such rules 
cannot cover the richness and the variability of practical contexts. It is by context-
dependent deviations from canonical rules, with the ensuing need for improvisation and 
experimentation (Brown & Duguid employed Levy-Strauss’ concept of bricolage) that 
learning arises, also in the sense of a shift of knowledge, in interaction between members 
of the community. This is based on ‘storytelling’, to capture and share context-bound 
experience, to guide experimentation. As a result, communities emerge from shared work 
practice rather than that they are designed ex ante.  
The notion that cognition is embedded, and arises from interaction with the 
environment, goes back to Vygotsky (1962) and Piaget (1970, 1974), with their idea that 
‘intelligence is internalised action’.
1  In sociology, the idea that cognition arises from 
interaction of people with their (especially social) environment arises, in particular, in the 
‘symbolic interactionism’ proposed by G.H. Mead (1934, 1984). In the organization 
literature, this has been introduced, in particular, by Weick (1979, 1995), who 
reconstructed organization as a ‘sense-making system’. 
The notion that cognition is embedded in practice and also rooted in the body arises 
also in recent work of cognitive scientists (Damasio 1995, 2003, Edelman 1987, 1992, 
Lakoff & Johnson 1999). In philosophy, it goes back to Merleau-Ponty (1964), who also 
argued that ‘the light of reason is rooted in the darkness of the body’. Building on the 
philosophy of Spinoza, Damasio (2003) demonstrated a hierarchy of cognition, where 
rationality is driven by feelings, which in turn have a substrate of physiology, in a 
‘signaling from body to brain’. The process of association yields many un- or 
subconscious neural structures that constitute what we experience as intuition. Since 
those are automatic they are often experienced are more ‘authentic’ and ‘intrinsic’ than 
rational evaluation. They do have the advantage of being faster than rational evaluation, 
                                                 
1 I am aware of the criticism of Piaget’s views and methodology of research (cf. Flavell 1967). However, I 
still think that some of his basic intuitions and ideas are valid. Apart from methodological criticism of 
Piaget’s work, a substantive point of criticism is that Piaget’s view is under-socialised. Here, there was an 
interesting difference of interpretation between Piaget and Vygotsky. In language acquisition by children, a 
phenomenon on which Piaget and Vygotsky agreed was that at some point children engage in ego-centric 
speech, oriented towards the self rather than social others, and that this subsequently declines. Piaget 
interpreted this as an outward movement from the self to the social other; a ‘decentration’ from the self. 
Vygotsky ascribed it to a continued movement into the self, in an ongoing process of formation and 
identification of the self and development of independent thought. The reason that egocentric speech 
declines is that overt speech is partly replaced by ‘inner speech’. I think Vygotsky’s interpretation is the 
correct one.  
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and this fast response on the basis of mental routines has survival value, in the flight form 
danger and the spurt towards opportunity. Intuitions and reflexes are typically laden with 
emotion, which affects how deeply they are embedded and how easily, and on what 
occasions, they are triggered. Symbols typically trigger intuitions or reflexes with an 
appeal to their emotional content (Siemsen 2006).  
Embeddedness of cognition goes together with embeddedness of meaning. The 
reference of terms is generally indeterminate without their embedding in a specific action 
context, in combination with the embodied web of largely tacit belief. John Searle used 
the notion of ‘background’, illustrated with the eating of a hamburger.
2 Unspecified, but 
obvious, is the condition that the hamburger enters the body not by the ear but by the 
mouth. I suggest that the background consists of the cognitive background, in a seamless 
web of cognition (Quine & Ullian 1970), of the observer, and the context, of words in a 
sentence, in a context of action. The latter triggers associations between connotations 
embodied in the former. In this way, embedding is needed to disambiguate expressions 
that by themselves are underdetermined in their reference.  
A second effect of embeddedness of meaning, I propose, is that any event of 
interpretation, in a context of action, shifts meanings. Even memory is not simple 
retrieval, but reconstruction based on the context, and this reconstruction alters the 
memory. In sum, we grasp our actions in the world to both disambiguate and construct 
meaning. How do meanings of words change in their use? Neural structures provide the 
basis for categorization, i.e. assigning a perceived object to a semantic class, on the basis 
of patterns of connotations that distinguish one category from another. It seems, however, 
that the activity of categorization brings in novel connotations, or patterns of them, from 
specific contexts of action, and affects the distribution of connotations across categories. 
Then, an expression (sentence, term, sign) never has the exact same meaning across 
different contexts of action. Furthermore, I propose that any such act of interpretation 
shifts the basis for it. Associations between terms, on the basis of shared or linked 
connotations, shift the distribution of those connotations across terms.  
In neurophysiological terms, this is embodied in selection and strengthening and 
weakening of connections between neuronal groups, as described by professor Edelman. 
In the brain, association arises from neurons being activated (‘firing’) simultaneously, 
which, when repeated, yields novel physical connections between the neurons, as a result 
of which later activation of one of them triggers activation of the other. Could this be 
indicative of a more general logic of structuration where structures in their mutual 
influence can function efficiently while changing in the process? 
There is much left to be investigated in the study of how the structuration of cognition, 
categorization and meaning proceeds. How does the use of words change their meaning 
while maintaining stability of meaning for interpretation and meaningful discourse? Are 
there ‘levels’ of change, with ‘minor change’ that leads on, somehow, to ‘large’ or wider 
‘structural’ change?  How would that work?  What happens in the brain in doing that? 
This yields a wide research programme, beyond the present paper. 
 
 
Exploitation, exploration and cognitive distance 
 
                                                 
2 At a conference on cognition and economics in Great Barrington, US, in 2003.    6
An important implication of the activity theory of cognition, in the present context, is that 
while we can make a conceptual distinction between exploitation (practice) and 
exploration (invention), they build upon each other. Exploration arises from practice, and 
practice arises from exploration. The question for this paper is whether that happens 
within or between communities. According to the notion of EC’s exploration arises 
within them. If COP’s are mostly exploitation oriented, could exploration arise from 
interaction between them? How could that work? If organizations must somehow be 
involved, within the organization or in interaction with other organizations, in both 
exploitation, to survive in the short term, and exploration, to survive in the long term, 
how is that combination to be achieved?  
  Nooteboom (2000) proposed a ‘heuristic of discovery’, by which exploration and 
exploitation arise from each other in a series of stages or different levels of learning. In 
learning for exploitation, inventions from exploration converge on dominant technical 
and organizational designs. To move towards new exploration, such dominant practice 
needs to be subjected to novel challenges, in novel contexts of application, in a stage of 
‘generalisation’, needed to yield the motivation and the insight needed for change. When 
change is needed, to survive in novel conditions, it is typically first sought in ‘proximate’ 
change, to maintain exploitation as much as possible, by novel selections from existing 
repertoires of action, in the stage of ‘differentiation’. When that does not suffice, more 
radical change is typically sought in the attempt to build in elements from newly 
encountered ‘foreign’ practices, in the new context of application, that appear to be 
successful where one’s own practice appears to fail, in the stage of reciprocation or 
hybridization. This typically yields hybrids that are inefficient, or even inconsistent, but 
yield an opportunity to experiment and explore the potential of novel elements. When 
such potential emerges, it yields a motivation for more radical of principles of design, 
principles or logic, and an indication of where that is to be sought, to realize emerging 
potential of novelty and to eliminate the inconsistencies or inefficiencies of the hybrid, in 
the stage of transformation or ’accommodation’. Bogenrieder & Nooteboom (2004b) 
applied the analysis to the ‘emergence of learning communities’. Here, I go back one step 
to analyse the relationship between exploitation, exploration and cognitive distance.   
  As a result of differences in physical and cultural environments that are embodied in 
cognition, the perception, interpretation and evaluation by people are path-dependent and 
idiosyncratic to a greater or lesser extent. By path-dependent I refer, here, to the 
condition that cognition takes place on the basis of categories that have developed in 
interaction with a certain context of action, so that the latter predisposes cognition. 
Cognition depends, literally, on the path of cognitive development. Different people see 
the world differently to the extent that they have developed in different social and 
physical surroundings and have not interacted with each other. In other words, past 
experience determines ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). This yields what I 
call ‘cognitive distance’ (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). 
  Cognitive distance between people, resulting from variety of experience, presents 
both a problem and an opportunity. The opportunity is that variety of cognition is a 
source of innovation. The problem is that to the extent that cognition differs, it is more 
difficult to understand each other and to collaborate and utilize opportunities from 
cognitive variety. Note that, cognition being a wide concept in this paper, cognitive 
distance entails both difference in intellectual knowledge and difference in feeling and   7
morality. Cognitive distance yields not only a difficulty of mutual understanding, or limit 
to absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal 1990), but a wider difficulty of collaboration, 
including a mismatch of moral and motivational aspects of collaboration. In other words: 
distance includes issues of both competence and governance. 
  Optimal collaboration requires a trade-off between the upside and the downside of 
cognitive distance, seeking an ‘optimal cognitive distance’, large enough to offer variety 
for innovation, and small enough to enable collaboration. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
----------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
If ability to collaborate declines with cognitive distance, say linearly, and novelty 
value increases with it, say linearly, and performance is proportional to the mathematical 
product of the two (potential x ability to utilize it), then performance is an inverted-U 
shaped function of distance, yielding some optimal distance. Now for exploitation 
(Figure 1b), which is oriented towards efficiency, in a fine tuning of complementary 
capabilities, where lack of error or mismatch is more important than novelty, the 
marginal utility of novelty is less (lower positive slope of the novelty line) than for 
exploration (Figure 1a), which is oriented at more radical novel combinations, and the 
marginal disutility of lack of understanding and ability to collaborate is greater (higher 
negative slope of the ability line). As a result, as illustrated in Figure 1, optimal cognitive 
distance is lower for exploitation than for exploration. In exploration cognitive distance 
has more relative advantage. This also illustrates the problem of combining exploitation 
and exploration in a single organizational unit: there is a tension between the needs for 
small and for large cognitive distance at the same time. We might now interpret Figure 1b 
as belonging to COP’s and Figure 1a as belonging to EC’s.  
One way to solve the problem of combining exploitation and exploration in one 
community is to specialize in either of the two, in a given community, and engage in 
collaboration with another community that specializes in the other. On the firm level, a 
classic example of this is that of small biotechnology firms that focus on the exploration 
of novel active substances or processes and then transfer the outcome to large 
pharmaceutical companies for its exploitation. However, there may be an alternative of 
combining different COP’s for the sake of exploration on the basis of cognitive distance 
between them. Or, in other words, could it be that several COP’s together may constitute 
a larger EC? But what is the meaning of cognitive distance if we shift from distance 
between individuals and distance between communities, or organizations?   
 
 
Exploration by interaction between communities 
 
Nooteboom et al (2006) applied the notion of optimal cognitive distance to collaboration 
between firms, in an attempt at an empirical test of the thesis of optimal cognitive 
distance. The hypothesis was that Figure 1 also applies on the level of organizations, in 
terms of cognitive distance between them. In that study, cognitive distance between firms 
was operationalised in terms of the dissimilarity between technology profiles of the firms   8
involved, derived from patent data: profiles that arise on the basis of the incidence of a 
firms in (some 300) different patent classes. The hypothesis was that innovative 
performance (in terms of patent production) between firms was an inverse U-shaped 
function of such distance, and the hypothesis was corroborated on a data set of alliances 
between 116 firms in a period of twelve years.  
That is not an unreasonable move, but how satisfactory is it to construct cognitive 
distance between groups in terms of the difference in the collective knowledge of those 
groups? An alternative would be to look at the difference in individual knowledge of 
those people from the different groups that actually interact in collaboration between 
those groups, i.e. the ‘boundary spanners’ between those groups? They may have limited 
distance between them and considerable distance to the other people in their respective 
groups. That distance is likely to be smaller than the distance in collective knowledge of 
the groups. To fulfill their role, boundary spanners must have an exceptionally large 
absorptive capacity, or ability to collaborate, in order to collaborate with both people 
within their own group and the boundary spanner of the connecting group. Boundary 
spanning is a delicate job. The boundary spanner’s loyalty to his own group may be in 
doubt for the very reason that he is able to empathize with outsiders. He may be seen to 
engage in illegitimate peripheral participation. In the empirical study of Nooteboom et al. 
such use of cognitive distance between boundary spanners rather than groups overall was 
not available in the data.  
The following questions arise. How could boundary spanning between COP’s yield 
exploration? Are there any reasons why this should happen between communities within 
rather than between separate organizations? What is the identity of communities and 
organizations by which cognitive distance gets limited, not to exceed its maximum?  
For an answer to the first question I turn to the ‘logic of discovery’ according to 
Nooteboom (2000) and summarized above. Collaboration across (greater or smaller) 
cognitive distance forces one to try and apply one’s knowledge in a novel context, in this 
case the practice of the partner (generalisation). There, one is faced with limitations in 
one’s own view and competence, and the need to adapt. The first step would be to try and 
adapt by differentiating one’s view according to existing repertoires of knowledge and 
competence (differentiation). If that is not sufficient, further interaction may yield the 
perception that one may try to adopt elements of what the partner is doing, which seem to 
function better than some elements of one’s own practice, in experimentation with a 
hybrid (reciprocation). This, then, yields both the opportunity to explore the potential of 
novel elements and insight into where inefficiencies and in the hybrid lie, as well as 
obstacles to the realization of the emerging potential of novelty, which provides both the 
incentive and some direction for a more radical change of principles of logic or design 
(accommodation). Note that what is different here from the original logic is that the 
process now is reciprocal. Partners can help each other in fitting in elements from their 
practice into hybridization of the partner’s practice, trying to explain how it works, with 
clever use of metaphors, examples, mental experiments or simulation. Next, they can try 
to jointly find novel design principles for a synthesis, in a new form.  
From the process we can also derive other requirements for boundary spanning. One 
is that in the process of differentiation the boundary spanner has to liaise back to his own 
community to find new options form existing repertoires. This will be needed not only 
for reasons of competence but also for reasons for governance, in particular motivational   9
reasons. The next stage of hybridization, with its attendant inefficiencies and possible 
inconsistencies, will hardly be popular with community members unless they have first 
had the opportunity to exhaust alternatives from their existing repertoires. In the more 
radical, fundamental change of basic design principles they will not be willing to go 
along unless they have experienced the benefits of the potential of novelty that is 
becoming manifest. Soon this process will go beyond the capacity and capability of any 
single boundary spanning, and the process is likely to be complemented with taskforces 
and exchange of personnel between the partner communities, when its potential becomes 





On the basis of the activity based, social constructivist view of cognition, the literature on 
management and organization has developed the view that firms construct their own, 
more or less organization-specific meanings and interpretations, in the organization as a 
system of ‘sense-making’ (Weick 1995), ‘collective mind’ (Weick and Roberts 1993), 
system of ‘shared meanings’ (Smircich 1983), ‘interpretation system’ (Choo 1998), or a 
cognitive ‘focusing device’ (Nooteboom 2000). 
  In the present context, a cognitive focus, in the wide sense of including both 
substantive understanding (on the competence side) and morality (on the governance 
side), is needed, in communities and organizations, to limit cognitive distance from going 
beyond the optimum, given the orientation towards exploitation or exploration. Such 
focus is achieved on the basis of specialized semiotic systems, in language, symbols, 
metaphors, myths, and rituals. This is what we call organizational culture. Within 
communities focus is narrower, and culture tighter, than between communities within an 
organization. Organizational focus may be compared to the ‘habitus’ of an organization 
or community (Mutch 2003, Bourdieu 1986, 1990). 
  On the competence side, focus is needed to enable people to understand each other 
and connect complementary knowledge, without unduly restricting variety and creativity. 
How far variety (cognitive distance) is needed depends on orientation towards 
exploitation or exploration. On the governance side, focus is needed to motivate people to 
collaborate and share and connect knowledge, without unduly restricting autonomy, 
ambition and competitive spirit. Governance is needed to control ‘relational risk’, within 
and between communities and organizations. Here, I distinguish three kinds of risk. One 
is risk of (particularly one-sided) dependence, which is close to the ‘hold-up risk’ of 
transaction cost theory. One cause of that risk may be the relation-specific investment one 
has to make in order to make the relationship work, e.g. to achieve mutual understanding 
and trust. One will make such investment only when confident that one will recoup it in 
the relationship. A second risk is that of competition due to knowledge spillover: in 
collaboration for learning partners may run off with the knowledge one gives in order to 
compete, in profits, bonuses or career prospects. A third risk is that of psychological 
safety (Edmonson 1999): one may be hesitant to show ignorance or lack of competence, 
for the loss of prestige and reputation that may yield. Such loss may also have negative 
effects on prospects for career and future partnerships.    10
 Organizational focus also has a function of both selection and adaptation. In 
selection, it selects people, in recruitment but often on the basis of self-selection of 
personnel joining the organization because they feel affinity with it, and adaptation, in the 
socialization into the firm, and training, of incoming personnel. In between entry and 
socialization lies ‘peripheral participation’. To perform these functions, focus must be 
embodied in some visible form. Such form is needed for several reasons. One is to 
function as a signaling device to outsiders. That is needed as a basis of the (self)selection 
process of incoming staff, and for recognition and identification by other stakeholders, 
such as colleagues, customers and suppliers. More for the internal function of 
coordination, we find the exemplary behaviour of organizational heroes, corresponding 
myths, war stories and rituals. 
  This cognitive theory of the firm can be contrasted with earlier, contractual theories in 
economics (Alchian & Demsetz 1972, Williamson 1975, 1985, Hart 1995). The latter 
look at organizations as systems of contracts or material incentives, to control 
opportunism. However, increasingly it is has been recognized that for a variety of reasons 
ex-ante incentive design is problematic. Due to uncertainty concerning contingencies of 
collaboration, and limited opportunities for monitoring, ex ante measures of governance 
are seldom complete, and need to be supplemented with ex-post adaptation. Such 
uncertainties proliferate under present conditions of professional work and rapid 
innovation. Professional work is hard to monitor and evaluate, and requires considerable 
autonomy for its execution. Rapid innovation increases uncertainty of contingencies and 
makes formal governance, especially governance by contract, difficult to specify. If such 
specification is nevertheless undertaken, it threatens to form a straightjacket that 
constrains the scope for innovation (Nooteboom 1999). Furthermore, the attempt to use 
contracts to constrain opportunism tends to evoke mistrust that is retaliated by mistrust, 
while in view of uncertainty there is a need to operate on trust more than on contract 
(Nooteboom 2002). Organizational focus, provided by organizational culture, yields an 
epistemological and normative ‘background’ for ex-ante selection of staff to suit 
organizational focus, and for ex-post adaptation, as a basis for coordination, mutual 
understanding, mutual adaptation, decision-making, and conflict resolution. 
 
 
Details and differences of focus 
 
The question will arise what, more precisely, the difference is between cognitive focus on 
the level of a community and on the level of an organization with several communities. I 
indicated before that within communities focus is narrower, and culture tighter, than 
between communities within an organization. What does that mean, more precisely?  
Both inside and outside organizations, people have more goals, capabilities, roles and 
relations than those that are governed by organizational focus (Dimaggio 1997). Ring & 
van de Ven (1994) made a distinction between organizational roles people play and their 
behaviour ‘qua persona’. This was presaged by the distinction Simmel (1950[1917]) 
made between a person’s function in an organization, which takes up only part of his 
personality, and his full personality. So, one question is how far organizational focus 
reaches in affecting actions of people. Berger & Luckmann (1966) distinguished between   11
primary socialization in family, as one grows up, and, building on that and molding it 
further, secondary socialization in places of work.  
The content and extent of cognitive alignment in organizations varies. In addition to 
the distinction between the competence and governance sides of focus, there are five 
dimensions for both. First, there is width, i.e. the range of different areas of competence 
and governance in a firm to which focus applies. This depends on the range of 
capabilities that a firm encompasses. Second, there is reach, i.e. the number of aspects 
within each area covered by the focus. Does it affect all or only some key aspects of a 
given capability? A third dimension is tightness versus looseness, i.e. narrowness of 
tolerance levels of standards or rules imposed by focus, versus allowance for slack and 
ambiguity, with improvised, unforeseen meanings, actions, etc. For exploitation focus 
needs to be tighter, and for exploration more loose.  
Fourth, focus may have different content. In particular, on the governance side it may 
entail formal, i.e. depersonalized, norms of legitimacy, which regulate what managers 
and workers can legitimately do and can expect from each other. Such norms render 
relations more impersonal and thereby reduce tensions associated with the exercise of 
personal power, and they enlist workers to participate in the control of their colleagues 
(Scott 1992: 306). The content of focus may also be more cultural, in the sense of 
offering guidance by more emotion-laden underlying values, expressed in symbolic 
entities, behaviours, events or processes. The two types of content are related, since 
norms of legitimacy may be expressed culturally. One can have norms of legitimacy that 
are specified rigorously and formally, and one can have more informal, ambiguous, 
cultural features that go beyond norms of legitimacy. The first occurs more in 
exploitation and the second more in exploration. 
Fifth, and this will turn out to be a central point, focus may relate to surface 
regulations concerning specific actions or to underlying more fundamental notions, in a 
deep structure of logic, principles or cognitive categories that form the basis for surface 
regulation. A surface rule or regulation allows for a certain range of activities; a deep 
structure allows for a range of surface regulations. Simon (1976) already acknowledged 
that an organization controls not decisions but their premises. Nelson & Winter (1982) 
made a similar distinction, between routines and ‘meta-routines’ that guide the 
development of routines. Schein (1985) made a similar distinction in organizational 
culture. Below surface features such as specific rules, practices, symbols, myths, rituals, 
at the basis of organizational culture lie fundamental views and intuitions regarding the 
relation between the firm and its environment (‘locus of control’: is the firm master or 
victim of its environment), attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge (objective or 
constructed), the nature of man (loyal and trustworthy/self-interested or opportunistic), 
the position of man (individualistic or part of a community), and relations between people 
(rivalrous or collaborative), which inform content and process of strategy, organizational 
structure, and styles of decision-making and coordination. Schein also allowed for an 
intermediate level, connecting the fundamental cognitive categories with the surface level 
of specific structures and rules, in the form of general principles that express fundamental 
cognitive categories but are yet general and generic rather than specific to certain 
activities and contexts.  
The difference between activities, surface regulation and deep structure is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 2. Here, for simplicity of exposition, the intermediate   12
level of culture is left out. A given surface regulation enables a bundle of potential 
actions. An underlying cognitive category in deep level structure enables a bundle of 
surface level regulation. The establishment of coordination on the surface level (routines, 
if one wants to use that term) leaves freedom for variety of underlying cognitive 
categories, but has to be set up ad hoc each time, and requires the solution of 
complications due to differences in underlying cognition. The establishment of 
coordination on the deep level yields more ex ante agreement for setting up surface 
regulation, and thus enhances flexibility and speed of action, but it reduces variety of 
cognition on the deep level. It entails more indoctrination.  Thus efficient exploitation is 
enhanced by deep level coordination, and exploration is constrained by it.  
 
-------------------------------  
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
I will argue that organizations serve especially to coordinate on the deep level, with 
an advantage of easier and faster understanding and agreement, to enable exploitation, 
while collaboration between organizations operates more on the surface level, with the 
advantage of greater variety on the deep level, allowing for a wider scope of exploration. 
Organizational focus entails a certain myopia, which can be compensated with external 
relationships between firms, at greater cognitive distance. Here, the theory of the firm 
includes a theory of inter-firm relationships. 
  The notion of cognitive distance entails a distinction between reducing and crossing 
cognitive distance. Reducing cognitive distance entails alignment on the deep level of 
cognition, so that people think more similarly. Crossing cognitive distance entails making 
surface agreements while maintaining differences on the deep level, with people 
continuing to think differently. When people who think differently continue interaction, 
starting from surface agreements, they may in time come to think more similarly, i.e. 
share underlying cognition, in a reduction of cognitive distance.  
 
 
Why communities within organizations? 
 
If COP’s are needed primarily for efficient exploitation, and exploration can take place in 
EC’s, or in interaction between COP’s, why have organizations that consist of more than 
one community?  Why not have one organization or firm per community? In other words, 
what is the difference in cognitive focus between a community and an organization or 
firm? I propose that this has to do with the difference between the competence and 
governance sides of cognitive distance and organizational focus. 
  Very briefly and schematically, I propose that firms allow for considerable (but still 
limited) internal distance in competence between communities, while they limit distance 
in governance, on the basis of a certain style or ‘habitus’ on the moral side of 
collaboration, across a variety of contents of knowledge. Within COP’s, distance is small 
in both competence and governance. The advantage of this, compared to collaboration 
between different organizations, is that collaboration across different competencies, 
located in different COP’s, for the sake of exploration, can be set up quickly and   13
relatively smoothly, compared to the problems of aligning interests and styles of 
collaboration across different organizations that differ more on the moral side. By 
contrast, within professional communities (PC’s), extending across different 
organizations, there is limited distance on the competence side but considerable distance 
on the governance side. Between professionals there is easy understanding but not 
necessarily ease of collaboration. In other words, organizations combine variety in 
competence with some unity in governance, while in professions it is the other way 
around. 
  Next, I try to specify differences between organizations, COP’s, EC’s and PC’s in 
more detail, in terms of the features of cognitive focus. This is summarized in Table 1.   
 
--------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
According to Table 1, I propose that in organizations cognitive distance is limited in 
competence, allowing for some variety of potentially complementary competencies, and 
small in governance, with a cognitive focus that applies mostly to a limited range of 
moral categories (reach), but on a deep level of basic values, often with partly formal and 
partly informal (symbolic) features. In epistemic communities (EC’s), distance is limited 
in competence, aiming for variety but also complementarity, but they build on limited 
cognitive distance in governance, offered by organizational culture, and have limited, 
informal and loose reach of aspects of behaviour, little depth of focus on top of that 
provided by the organization, and only some additional surface regulations. In  
communities of practice (COP’s), distance is small in both competence and governance,  
cognitive focus has a wide, pretty tight, typically informal reach, with considerable deep 
structure in addition to that provided by the organization. In PC’s, across organizations, 
distance is small in competence, large in governance, and there is little reach of focus, but 
it is pretty tight and deep, in fundamental substantive principles or paradigms of the 
profession.  
Together, these forms of organization are highly complementary, and together enable 
a system of exploitation and exploration that can be highly efficient. Organizations yield 
some variety of internal competence, though this is limited by the potential 
complementarity of competencies, with communities of practice for efficient 
exploitation, epistemic communities and interaction between different communities of 
practice as sources of exploration, building on a relative ease of collaboration on the 
governance focus offered by the organization. Organizational focus by definition yields 
some organizational myopia, which limits exploration and innovation, but this can be 
compensated by inter-organizational collaboration, at larger cognitive distance, although 
there more time is needed to set up surface regulation, or to develop some shared deep-
level categories to facilitate collaboration. PC’s across organizations serve to deepen 
professional expertise, in an exchange of experience across a variety of contexts of 
application. 
Note that in the latter we see a re-appearance of the ‘logic of discovery’ that was 
summarized before. When professionals get together to compare experience in different 
contexts of application, this yields a setting for ‘generalization’ that through   14
‘differentiation’ and ‘reciprocation’ may yield renewal and ultimately revolutionary 
change in the profession, although for the latter one may need novel combinations 
between different disciplines.   
 
 
Conclusions and further research 
 
The differences and relations between different kinds of community, in particular 
communities of practice (COP’s) and epistemic communities (EC’s), and the 
organization of which they may form a part, can be clarified on the basis of the activity 
based theory of knowledge that is commonly used in the literature. That theory yields the 
notion of cognitive distance, and the trade-off between its advantage for novelty and its 
disadvantage in limited ability to collaborate. This yields the notion of optimal cognitive 
distance in a community, and the difference between between COP’s and EC’s. In 
organizations and communities, cognitive distance is limited by ‘cognitive focus’.  
Cognitive distance and organizational focus have a competence side, in substantive 
knowledge, and a governance side, in morality, i.e. norms and values of conduct. 
Exploitation takes place in COP’s. Exploration may take place in EC’s or in interaction 
between COP’s, within and between organizations.  
The way in which interaction between individuals and communities at a cognitive 
distance yields exploration can be understood from a ‘logic’ or heuristic of learning, with 
different stages, derived from earlier research. This has implications for the roles of 
boundary spanners that bridge the cognitive distance between communities. Further 
details concerning levels of change in the interaction between communities, see 
Bogenrieder & Nooteboom (2004b).  
While Table 1 applies to cognitive distance and relationships within communities, 
one can do a similar analysis concerning distance and relations between communities, as 
Cohendet (2005) did, and some of logic developed here can be used to do extend that 
analysis. However, that  goes beyond the limits of the present paper.  
A central point of the present analysis is the following. There is a cognitive division 
of labour between communities and organizations. Within organizations there is some but 
limited distance in competence, and small distance in governance. In COP’s there is 
small distance in both competence and governance. In EC’s there is small distance in 
governance and some distance in competence. In PC’s there is small distance in 
competence and large distance in governance. Exploration in interaction between COP’s 
within an organization is facilitated by shared organizational focus in governance, but 
limited by the limited cognitive distance within an organization. The potential for 
exploration is larger between organizations, at larger cognitive distance, in both 
competence and governance, but requires more time and effort to set up and regulate 
collaboration. PC’s enable professional development to tap into the diversity of 
application across organizations. Employing the potential of their cognitive 
complementarity, these different forms of organization can together yield efficient 
systems of exploitation and exploration.  
Next to the effects of cognitive distance, there is analysis to be done of the effects of 
the structure, strength and content of ties on novelty value and ability to collaborate. This 
will yield further insight into organizational structure, in the configuration of people in   15
communities, and of communities in organizations, and their effects on exploitation and 
exploration. That goes beyond the present paper, but for analysis and empirical tests for 
relationships between organizations, see Gilsing et al. (2006).   
  The distinction between COP, EC and PC is very schematic. In fact there is a greater 
variety of groups for learning or development, as demonstrated by Bogenrieder & 
Nooteboom (2004a). They used criteria of different kinds to categorize what, to avoid 
confusion, they called ‘learning groups’ rather ‘communities’. The structure, strength and 
content of ties form part of those criteria. Structure has six dimensions and strength five. 
One dimension of strength is the frequency with which members meet and another is how 
long membership lasts. Content includes the subject of knowledge (technical, 
commercial, organizational), the type of knowledge in terms of tacit or more codified 
knowledge, and the level of learning, i.e. exploitation or exploration, involved. In 
addition, there are different types of relational risk (of dependence, competition, and 
psychological safety, cf. Edmonson 1999) and different instruments of governance to 
deal with them. By configuring these features in different ways one can generate a vast 
number of different potential kinds of learning groups. 
Empirically, they found five groups. One was characterized as a project team, and had 
some similarity to the notion of a COP. One aspect where it differed was that since the 
group was oriented at temporary projects, membership was shorter than one would expect 
for a COP. None of the groups could be recognized as an EC, in the sense of being 
engaged in exploration of novel products or processes. Two groups seemed like PC’s, but 
in different ways. One was aimed at the development of professional expertise, among 
members of the same profession, but all within the same organization, and the other was 
aimed at the development of behavioural and managerial skills among people from 
different professions, within the organization. This indicates that while in the discussion 
of communities we are inclined to think of technical expertise and skill, learning may be 
oriented also towards behavioural and organizational skills. The innovation literature 
used to have a similar bias towards technological innovation, but has learned to also look 
at organizational innovation. A fourth group was aimed at improvement of projects by 
exchange of experience from different projects. That group failed because the projects 
involved were too diverse, and required too much explanation of specific contents and 
conditions of projects before mutual understanding was established, with difficulties in 
codifying the tacit knowledge involved in the projects, and the stability of membership 
was too low to solve problems of psychological safety. This illustrates that in connecting 
different project teams or COP’s one must take the time to develop mutual absorptive 
capacity. This entails a specific investment in the sense of transaction cost theory, with 
the implication that the relationship must be expected to last sufficiently long to make 
that investment worth while. The group transformed itself into a group that was purely 
oriented at the exchange of location knowledge (Hutchins & Klausen 1996, Moreland 
1999). Having established where interesting projects take place, people can contact them 
to develop a more intensive, durable and psychologically safer relationship needed for 
mutual learning. Another group with a similar objective of project improvement was 
successful by replacing accounts of real projects by stylized, virtual cases that required 
less investment in attention up front and solved the problem of psychological safety.  
My conclusion is that the notion of EC’s should be widened to include a wider variety 
of learning groups, and that the notion of PC’s should be widened to allow for exchange   16
of behavioural, organizational or managerial professional competence next to more 
technical professional expertise. As a result, the analysis of the total system of 
exploitation and exploration will include a greater variety of learning groups, with a 
richer analysis of dimensions of cognitive distance and cognitive focus than provided in 
Table 1. However, the basic logic will still apply that the advantage of having such 
groups within an organization is that on the basis of organizational focus in governance 
they can be set up more easily than between different organizations. The disadvantage is 
that cognitive distance remains limited, yielding myopia, and outside relationships are 
needed to repair for that, at the price of more time and costs in setting them up.       
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Figure 1  Exploitation and exploration 
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Figure 2  Levels of coordination 
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Table 1  Organizations, COP’s, EC’s and PC’s 
 
      Organizations   EC’s      COP’s     PC’s 
     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cognitive distance    
in competence     limited       limited     small       small 
in governance     small        small      small      large 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Characteristics of     
cognitive focus 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
reach          small         limited     wide      small         
 
tightness        large        small      large      large       
 
content         fairly formal    in formal    informal    formal or informal 
                       
surface/deep level   deep         surface     deep      deep 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 